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Pay discrimination, like many forms of discrimination, is a
particularly stubborn problem. In many instances, just as with other
forms of discrimination, it is unrealistic to allocate all the blame and
burden on a single actor, whether it be an employer or employee. Thus,
the traditional civil rights regime in which an individual actor is held
liable for the discrimination does a poor job of dealing with this problem.
I propose an intervention-pay transparency-that would help prevent,
root out, and correct the discrimination in the first place, instead of
relying on after the fact blame and liability.
Pay transparency-the ability for employees to find out what other
employees in their workplace make-is rare outside of public
employment, and cultural norms against talking about one's income may
make the concept anxiety-producing to some readers. Yet, unlike many
other approaches to reducing seemingly "blameless" discrimination, such
as targeting unconscious discrimination, or potentially counterproductive
debiasing efforts, incentivizing pay transparency can fit very comfortably
within our legal framework. By turning pay transparency into an
affirmative defense to pay discrimination claims, this preventive measure
can be woven neatly into our current approach to civil rights enforcement
and notions of individual responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Have you ever wondered how much money your coworker is
making? Did you assume you were paid the same because you had the
same job? Did you guess she was paid less because she was a slacker?
Or more because her dad was friends with the boss? If you have
wondered, you are like most workers in the United States, who believe
asking someone how much money he makes is impertinent and whose
employers keep salaries secret.' What would happen if you no longer
had to wonder, and instead you could look up your officemate's salary
on a company website? You might think this would be unnerving, as she
could look up your salary too. On the other hand, especially if you work
1. INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, PAY SECRECY AND WAGE
DISCRIMINATION 1 (2011) ("Nearly half of all workers nationally are either contractually
forbidden or strongly discouraged from discussing their pay with their colleagues,
according to results from the IWPR/Rockefeller Survey of Economic Security.").
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for a state employer, you might already be in this situation,2 and you
probably accept it, though you may not like it. But much more is at stake
in choosing pay transparency than your social discomfort. Lack of pay
transparency facilitates continued pay discrimination, and it permits
employers to exploit historical and societal discrimination for their own
gain.
Pay discrimination, like many forms of discrimination, is a
particularly stubborn problem and difficult to remedy. 3  In many
instances, just as with other forms of discrimination, allocating all the
blame and burden for its continued existence on a single actor is
unrealistic. Some of the blame lies with the employer, some with
employee, and some with societal and historical discrimination.4 For
instance, neither the employer nor the employee is entirely at "fault," in
the commonly understood sense of the term, when that employee has
been socialized not to apply for certain jobs or to ask for more money.
The employer exploits that situation in a passive manner, by watching in
silence as the employee's pay slips behind her male counterparts, and
neither party is the sole cause of the socialization.' Similarly, neither the
2. Id. at 2 ("Prohibiting or discouraging pay discussions occurs less frequently in
the public sector, where only one in six workers (16.2 percent) report restrictions on pay
discussions. Indeed, almost two thirds of public sector workers (65 percent) report that
pay information is publicly available.").
3. Title VII forbids discrimination in wages and other compensation on the basis of
race, sex, national original, religion, and skin color. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
Nevertheless, wage disparities based on these categories often persist, even after
controlling for legitimate, non-discriminatory variables such as education, hours worked,
and the like. While this does not necessarily mean that intentional discrimination is a
significant contributor to the disparities, it is likely that forms of unintentional
discrimination are a significant contributor. See discussion infra Part II.
4. Compare Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack
of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1816 (1990) (arguing that "[s]ex
segregation persists not because most women bring to the workworld fixed preferences
for traditionally female jobs, but rather because employers structure opportunities and
incentives and maintain work cultures and relations so as to disempower most women
from aspiring to and succeeding in traditionally male jobs," and that therefore, "title VII
can play a major role in producing the needed changes. . . . By attributing women's
aspirations to forces external and prior to the workworld, courts deny their own ability to
(re)construct workplace arrangements and the work aspirations that arise out of those
arrangements."); with Carrie Lukas, There Is No Male-Female Wage Gap, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870
4415104576250672 504707048.html (arguing that "choice of occupation . . . plays an
important role in earnings. While feminists suggest that women are coerced into lower-
paying job sectors, most women know that something else is often at work. Women
gravitate toward jobs with fewer risks, more comfortable conditions, regular hours, more
personal fulfillment and greater flexibility.").
5. See LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION
AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003) (arguing that women are socialized not to ask for what
they want, particularly in the workplace); see also Schultz, supra note 4.
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employer nor the employee is entirely at "fault" when a rogue supervisor
discriminates without telling anyone, an employee receives
discriminatorily low pay, and neither she nor higher level management
realize what has happened. She may not know that her equally or even
less meritorious colleagues make more money, and upper level
management may not know that she is just as meritorious, if not more,
than those colleagues. Even the supervisor may be unaware, if the
discrimination was unconscious.
In this article, I approach pay discrimination from a perspective that
seeks to deal with discrimination even where blame is not easy to assign.
The widespread nature of responsibility for the problem has led some to
liken discrimination to a "public health" problem, best addressed "not in
the traditional manner of assigning individual responsibility and blame."7
I embrace this perspective and explore the unique ways in which pay
discrimination continues to infect our labor markets. I propose a new
kind of intervention into discrimination through pay transparency-one
that leverages the financial self-interest of employers and employees.
Pay transparency-the ability for employees to find out what other
employees in their workplace make-is rare outside of public
employment. But it would provide both employees and employers
greater ability to prevent, root out, and correct pay discrimination-both
intentional and unintentional-in the first place. Pay transparency has
radical potential to spur change, and cultural norms against talking about
one's income may make it frightening to some readers. Yet, unlike many
other approaches to reduce seemingly "blameless" discrimination, such
as targeting unconscious discrimination, or potentially
6. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506, 1512-14
(2005) (noting a "substantial decline" in racial stereotyping and prejudice explicitly
acknowledged by survey participants over the last 50 years, but summarizing a number of
studies documenting some form of "implicit bias" much stronger than the mild explicit
bias).
7. See Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought
Experiment in the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 101
(2010).
8. See id. at 100 (explaining "that the argument in favor of holding the employer
liable . .. on the basis of her implicit racial bias implies a shift in the operative model of
discrimination from a justificatory conception (in which discrimination is centrally
defined by a certain kind of inadequacy in an agent's putative rationale in acting) to a
causal conception (in which discrimination is defined by the presence of a certain kind of
causal influence in an action's psychological etiology)"); see also Katharine T. Bartlett,
Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit
Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1901-02 (2009) (relying on "[s]ocial
science research suggest[ing] that people are most likely to internalize norms when they
feel autonomous, competent, and related to others," and that "[r]ote compliance by those
who are resigned or indifferent, perhaps even hostile, to nondiscrimination norms . . . will
not achieve significant headway against implicit discrimination").
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counterproductive efforts to intervene in the decisionmaking process that
bump up against legal constructions of autonomy,9 incentivizing pay
transparency can fit comfortably within our legal framework. It requires
only modest changes to Title VII, ones that can be woven neatly into our
current approach to civil rights enforcement and notions of individual
responsibility.
The article has four parts in addition to this introduction. In Part II,
I briefly summarize the research on wage gaps associated with gender
and race. This research generally points to discrimination, both
intentional and unintentional, as partial causes for these wage gaps.
While Title VII covers both intentional and unintentional discrimination,
some courts are understandably reluctant to hold employers liable for
discrimination that results, in part, from societal and historical
discrimination, such as the socialization of women and people of color to
negotiate less aggressively. 0 On the other hand, even if their level of
responsibility is low, employers may be in the best position to prevent
the discrimination, and as I will explain, in the case of wage
discrimination resulting from societal and historical discrimination, the
employers profit from that discrimination at the expense of the
discrimination's victims.
In Part III, I explore the benefits of pay transparency. I begin by
presenting summaries of empirical evidence for my hypothesis that lack
of pay transparency causes a disparate impact on women and people of
color. Part III also provides the theoretical support for why this might be
the case. It explains how pay transparency would improve the ability of
less aggressive, less self-confident, and less "in the know" employees to
negotiate for fair pay.
In Part IV, I explore the perceived costs of pay transparency. I
argue that almost none of these costs are social costs, in the sense that
they reduce the productivity of a business and its workers. Rather, most
of the costs of pay transparency represent shifts in profit share from
employers to employees. I acknowledge that one of these costs may
represent a social cost, in the form of decreased productivity in some
workplaces-though only some. The magnitude of this cost, and
therefore whether it is outweighed by benefits in the form of reduced
discrimination, is difficult to estimate. However, I explain how
9. For a strongly pro-autonomy version of this position, see Gregory Mitchell,
Libertarian Paternalism Is An Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1245 (2005) (arguing that
"even the more truly libertarian paternalism . . . may lead to a redistribution of resources
from rational to irrational persons that cannot be reconciled with the libertarian
prohibition on state-based takings for any purpose other than remedying involuntary
exchanges").
10. See sources cited infra Part II.B.2.c.
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incentivizing pay transparency via an affirmative defense or safe harbor
can mitigate this cost, by targeting employers whose own self-assessment
indicates higher risk of liability for pay discrimination and lower costs of
pay transparency.
In Part V, I operationalize this theory, translating these general
ideas into a concrete proposal for employment law reform. My proposal
accounts for the competing concerns set forth in Part II by rewarding
those employers who take steps to prevent and correct discrimination, in
the form of a defense or safe harbor from liability when employees do
not voice their concerns in a timely fashion. It would also put the onus
on employees to break out of their comfort zones when they see
discriminatory pay disparities. They must demand better pay, or seek to
switch to a more well-compensated job track. I provide the details of
what would be sufficient to establish the elements of the affirmative
defense or safe harbor.
The Lilly Ledbetter Act was the first piece of legislation President
Obama signed." It overturned Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire,12 which held
that the statute of limitations under Title VII-only 180 days-does not
run from the date an employee receives a discriminatory paycheck, but
rather from the initial act of discrimination underlying the unfair
paycheck, which may have been years prior.13 Many found the outcome
unfair because Lilly Ledbetter's claim was found time-barred even
though she had no idea she was being discriminated against for years. 14
But a two-year cap on backpay under Title VII still prevents full
recovery for people, like Ledbetter, who only discover discrimination
decades after it begins.' 5 Worse, most employees will never discover the
problem and will recover nothing. We need to incentivize practices like
pay transparency to make real inroads into discrimination.
II. WAGE GAPS AND THEIR CAUSES, INCLUDING DISCRIMINATION
Is pay transparency a solution to a problem that does not exist? In
other words, is pay discrimination really happening? Is there a lot of it,
and is it the kind of rampant, culturally sticky problem that we should
respond to in the way we responded as a country to harassment? In this
Part, I briefly provide evidence that the answer to these questions is yes.
11. Lilly Ledbetter Pay Act of 2009, 123 Stat 5 (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(3)); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html.
12. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire& Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
13. Id at 628-29.
14. Id at 650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
15. Lilly Ledbetter Pay Act of 2009, 123 Stat 5 (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(3)(B)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (2006).
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A. Evidence ofPay Gaps
There is a great deal of evidence that women and racial minorities
still experience large pay gaps. Because Title VII prohibits both
intentional and unintentional discrimination, the law is concerned with
wage gaps even when they are not rooted in intentional race, sex, or
other prohibited discrimination.16 The law prohibits even unintentional
discrimination, if not justified by practices that serve a "business
necessity."" For instance, if an employer paid people more the taller
they were, this practice would have a disparate impact on women, who
are on average shorter. Even in the absence of any intent to cause the
disparate impact on women, the employer would have violated Title VII,
unless the employer could prove that the better salaries for tall people
served a "business necessity." 8
Importantly, not all of the documented wage gaps can be explained
by factors that are likely to be related to business necessity, such as
degrees, skills, hours worked,' 9 or even internal performance
evaluations.2 0 Indeed, researchers have had difficulty fully explaining
these gaps by controlling for all sorts of factors independent of race and
sex, such as the above variables, whether employees have children, and
more. 2 1 Many meta-analyses of wage disparities come to the conclusion
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (k) (2006).
17. Id. at § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
18. See id. § 2000e-2(k) (placing the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove
business necessity); see also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 435-36
(1975) (rejecting an employer's attempts to show that diploma requirements and
standardized tests served a business necessity); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
436 (1971) ("Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures;
obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job
performance.").
19. E.g., GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WOMEN'S EARNINGS: WORK PATTERNS
PARTIALLY EXPLAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN'S AND WOMEN'S EARNINGS, GAO-04-35
(2003).
20. E.g., Emilio J. Castilla, Gender, Race, and Meritocracy in Organizational
Careers, 113 AM. J. Soc. 1479, 1481, 1484-45 (2008) (In a study of a private, primarily
service-sector employer with 20,000 employees, Castilla found "evidence of
performance-reward bias and show[ed] that different salary increases are granted for
observationally equivalent employees (i.e., those in the same job and work unit, with the
same supervisor and same human capital) who receive the same performance evaluation
scores. This finding of performance-reward bias is robust after controlling for a number
of complicating factors, including employee turnover.").
21. E.g., id; Stephen Kulis, Diane Sicotte & Shawn Collins, More than a Pipeline
Problem: Labor Supply Constraints and Gender Stratification Across Science
Disciplines, 43 RES. IN HIGHER ED. 657 (2002); Christine Alksnis, Serge Desmarais &
James Curtis, Workforce Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap: Is "Women's" Work as
Highly Valued as "Men's"?, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1416 (2008).
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that gender wage gaps tend to be accounted for by a combination of
variables.
One variable is simply intentional discrimination, and there is little
controversy around imposing liability for any wage gap due to this
variable, though it can be hard to catch. Some of the other variables,
such as human capital,22 or changing market prices for particular jobs,23
are likely related to business necessity, and most policymakers would not
want to impose liability for wage gaps related to these variables. A third
set of variables, however, are likely not related to business necessity, yet
imposing liability for the wage gaps resulting from these variables would
be quite controversial, because it is difficult to allocate responsibility for
these variables between individual employers, employees, and other
social forces. These variables include sex segregation of the work
force,24 which may be driven by social norms that employers only bear
partial responsibility for.25
The quantity of studies examining race and gender wage gaps and
attempting to account for their causes is far too vast to survey
comprehensively in this article. However, a few examples will paint the
picture.
For example, one study of pay at a regional United States university
found statistically significant pay differences associated with gender
"even after controlling for rank, academic field, and years of service ...
in fields traditionally viewed as female as well as science fields with
,,26
typically lower female representation.
Another 1997 survey found "statistically significant gender
differences" in earnings of "securities professionals with highly similar
human capital characteristics."27 The study controlled for marital status,
whether the professionals had children, experience, hours worked per
week, college majors, area of practice, firm, and the organizational
measure of whether the professional was at vice president status or
22. E.g., Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3
J. LAB. ECON. S33 (1985).
23. E.g., Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Swimming Upstream: Trends in
the Gender Wage Differential in the 1980s, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 1 (1997).
24. See Blau & Kahn, supra note 23; Kulis, Sicotte & Collins, supra note 21;
Alksnis, Desmarais & Curtis, supra note 21.
25. Schultz, supra note 4 (arguing that employers do bear some responsibility);
Kulis, Sicotte & Collins, supra note 21 (attributing some of the sex segregation in the
academy to differences in academic cultures).
26. Cheryl B. Travis, Louis J. Gross & Bruce A. Johnson, Tracking the Gender Pay
Gap: A Case Study, 33 PSYCH. OF WOMEN Q. 410, 410 (2009).
27. Louise Marie Roth, Selling Women Short: A Research Note on Gender
Diferences in Compensation on Wall Street, 82 Soc. FORCES 783, 783 (2003).
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above.28 Even levels of sex segregation, meaning the concentration of
women or men in different areas of practice, were controlled for.29
Another study documented black men receiving lower wages even
when accounting for skill as measured by the employer's competitive
performance rating of workers. Indeed, black men were found to receive
"slightly lower returns than white men for equivalent performance
ratings." 30 In other words, even assuming that employers' assessments
of worker skill and performance are not themselves influenced by race,
race was still found to influence wages.
Finally, a fourth study found "gender, race, and nationality
differences" "affect[ing] salary growth [even] after performance ratings
are taken into account." The author concluded that "[a]lthough these
policies are often adopted in the hope of motivating employees and
ensuring meritocracy, policies with limited transparency and
accountability can actually increase ascriptive bias and reduce equity in
the workplace." The fact that "performance evaluation bias" may be
lurking in employers' ratings of employees means that the amount of the
salary disparities attributable to some form of discrimination may be
even greater than what studies that control for performance ratings
document.3 1
B. The Causes ofPay Gaps, and the Current Legal Regime's Response
In this Section, I investigate the causes of pay gaps and explain why
the current legal regime is not adequate as a solution. I argue that in
many cases, it is unclear whether employers are violating Title VII, and
that underlying this dispute is the fact that it is simply inaccurate in the
cases to describe employers as either entirely to blame or free of
responsibility. Even when the cause is more clearly a violation of Title
VII, I argue that in the absence of pay transparency, the discrimination
will often go undiscovered.
1. Intentional Discrimination
There is a great deal of dispute over whether intentional
discrimination is a significant variable influencing gender and race based
pay disparities, or whether studies such as the ones described above
simply have not controlled for all the variables other than discrimination
that could explain the disparities. To the extent there is intentional
28. Id. at 793.
29. Id.
30. Major G. Coleman, Job Skill and Black Male Wage Discrimination, 85 Soc. ScI.
Q. 892, 893 (2003).
31. Castilla, supra note 20, at 1482.
10512012]
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discrimination, it is uncontroversial that Title VII should cover the
discrimination, but unfortunately, employees may not know it is
happening, and employers may not know, either.
Lilly Ledbetter was an employee at Goodyear Tire. For decades,
unbeknownst to her, she received lower wages for the same work as her
male colleagues. When she discovered the discrepancy, she sued her
employer. Ledbetter alleged that years ago, her supervisor at the time,
now deceased, had sexually harassed her. When she rejected him, he
took revenge by giving her poor evaluations and taking other
discriminatory actions, unbeknownst to her, that led to decades of pay
discrimination. The jury presumably accepted this version of events,32
and therefore awarded her approximately $3.5 million in damages, which
were reduced to $360,000 by the district judge, in accordance with Title
VII's damage caps.33
Ledbetter's suit was found to be time-barred by the US Supreme
Court because Title VII has a statute of limitations of just 180 days, 34 and
the act of intentional discrimination that instigated the discrepancy had
occurred decades before. While Goodyear was vicariously liable for the
supervisor's actions, and while the injury he caused Ledbetter was
repeated every time she received a lower paycheck than she deserved, the
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations ran from the act of
intentional discrimination itself, not from each additional infliction of
injury.35
Enough outrage ensued that Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act, directing that the statute of limitation runs from each
issuance of an effectively discriminatory paycheck, not from the initial
act rooted in the intent to discriminate.3 6 President Obama signed it as
his first piece of legislation, and Ledbetter was reversed. But just as
Ledbetter had no notice of the discrimination she was suffering from,
some argued that Goodyear may have lacked notice as well.38 Goodyear
32. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 622, 632 n.4 (2007).
33. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1176 (11 h Cir. 2005);
42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3)(D) (2006).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).
35. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire, 550 U.S. at 628-29.
36. Lilly Ledbetter Payback Act of 2009,123 Stat. 5 (2009) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
37. Stolberg, supra note 11.
38. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 630-32, 632 n.4 (arguing that the underlying purposes of
statutes of limitations, including notice to the defendant, were particularly relevant in the
case at hand because "Ledbetter's claims of sex discrimination turned principally on the
misconduct of a single Goodyear supervisor"); id. at 657 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that doctrines such as laches would be sufficient to fulfill the purpose of
"'giv[ing] prompt notice to the employer"') (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002)).
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was certainly in a better position than Ledbetter to discover the
discrimination and probably should have figured it out in this particularly
egregious case," but neither party was in a perfect position. Certainly
we could imagine facts under which the employer genuinely had a hard
time figuring out that discrimination was occurring.
For instance, we could imagine a scenario in which an employee is
paid within the typical salary range for her job at the workplace, and her
salary is always at the lower end of that range. The fact that some
employees receive lower wages than other employees may be the result
of differences in merit, availability for overtime when it's offered, or
demonstrated loyalty to the company in intangible ways. All these
factors would be considered "legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons"40
under Title VII for paying someone less than her colleagues. Thus,
simply observing a wage or salary disparity may not be sufficient for an
employer to suspect that a supervisor to whom significant authority has
been delegated is discriminating. Add in the fact that performance
evaluations may be infected with bias that upper level management is
unaware of, and the employer may believe that the employee's lack of
merit has been confirmed and documented in poor evaluations. In the
absence of pay transparency, most employees, like Ledbetter, will not
even know the disparity exists, so they will not be able to question it
either.
Even under the new Act, Ledbetter would have only recovered for
at most two years of discrimination, given the two-year cap on backpay
in Title VII.4 1 If it takes years for an employee to find out he or she has
been discriminated against, the two-year cap prevents full recovery.
Even worse, many employees will never discover the discrimination.
The Act responds to public outrage, but changes little because it does
nothing to improve the chances of employer and employee discovering
the problem at a time it can be addressed fully.
39. Id. at 659-60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "Ledbetter's pay, during a
particular one-year period, fell below Goodyear's minimum threshold for her position").
40. E.g. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (first stating
the rule that a prima facie case of intentional discrimination may be rebutted by the
employer "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"); EEOC v. Consol.
Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that employer use of word-of
mouth hiring did not constitute intentional discrimination under Title VII if the hiring
method was "adopted because it is the most efficient," even with knowledge that this
"Just happens to produce a work force whose racial or religious or ethnic or national-
origin or gender composition pleases the employer").
41. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(B)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006).
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2. Unintentional Discrimination
While it is quite unclear how much intentional discrimination is
contributing to pay gaps, it appears quite likely that unintentional forms
of discrimination are playing a role. Whether Title VII prohibits these
forms of discrimination is not always clear. In a purely doctrinal sense,
it is unclear whether some of these employer actions or inactions serve a
"business necessity" or not,42 the defense under Title VII to claims that
an employer practice has a disparate impact on the basis of sex, race, or
other protected characteristics. Moreover, employers are neither entirely
responsible nor entirely without responsibility in these situations, in
which the disparities are partially caused by historical and societal
discrimination, but employers passively take advantage of that
discrimination.
a. Tendency to Preserve the Status Quo
In one example, discrimination, perhaps unintentional, enters into
the process of conducting market wage surveys that employers use to set
wages. Supervisors in the California state civil service system have
admitted, for instance, to a status quo bias in setting wages: when a
market wage survey comes back showing that the market wage for a job
is much higher or lower than what the state currently pays, supervisors
have admitted to adjusting the skills description for the job accordingly.
The reason is that they don't want to rock the boat by recommending a
huge change in wages for a particular job.43 In other words, they have
admitted to a process that seeks to maintain the status quo, which of
course reinstantiates past discrimination in setting wages, such as past
decisions to pay less for certain jobs simply because they were
commonly performed by women.
If the desire to maintain the status quo is understood as representing
intentional discrimination, it clearly violates Title VII. Courts have
consistently rejected claims by employers that ending intentionally
discriminatory practices would rock the boat too much, by interfering
with customer and coworker preferences." However, even if supervisors
42. See infra text accompanying notes 45-50, 62-63, 70.
43. Marlene Kim, Employers' Estimates of Market Wages: Implications for Wage
Discrimination in the U.S., 6 FEM. ECON. 97, 105-10 (2000).
44. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981)
(stating the rule that customer preference for one gender over another is not a BFOQ,
even in a case in which the customer preference at issue was that of foreign clients in
countries with different cultural mores than Americans); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1996) ("[T]he following situations do not warrant the application of
the bona fide occupational qualification exception: . . . The refusal to hire an individual
because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except as
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do not do this for intentionally discriminatory reasons (to privilege their
male friends because they are male), they are still preserving the status
quo with respect to wage setting, which has a disparate impact on the
basis of race and sex. There is a good argument that such behavior
violates Title VII; it is unlikely that claims of maintaining the status quo
as a "business necessity" will fly with most courts enforcing Title VII. It
is the employer's burden to prove that a practice having a disparate
impact serves a business necessity. 45 Tests and standards that predict
ability to perform a job successfully are a classic example of a practice
that serves a business necessity,46 though only where employers
successfully prove accuracy.47 In comparison, maintaining the status quo
with respect to who gets paid what, in order to avoid employees
objecting, does not seem nearly as "necessary" 48 or "job related."4 9
Moreover, it smacks of grandfathering in the beneficiaries of past
discrimination, and the seminal disparate impact case identified
"freez[ing] the status quo" as the core problem with practices having a
disparate impact.o
Yet, once again, it's hard for employees to know that this sort of
unfairness is going on, without pay transparency to alert them to
disparities that seem unwarranted in the face of what employees actually
contribute to the employer.
covered specifically in paragraph (a)(2) of this section [referring to the need for
actor/actress authenticity].").
45. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k) (2000) (placing the burden of persuasion on the
employer to prove business necessity, and permitting plaintiffs to rebut that showing by
demonstrating that an alternative employment practice would also serve the business
need with less of an impact); see also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
435-36 (1975) (rejecting an employer's attempts to show that diploma requirements and
standardized tests served a business necessity).
46. E.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678-79 (2009) (finding that there was
"no genuine dispute" that firefighter promotion "examinations were job-related and
consistent with business necessity"); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436
(1971) ("Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures;
obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job
performance.").
47. E.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("On the record before us, neither the high school
completion requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used."); Albermarle,
422 U.S. at 435-36 (rejecting an employer's attempts to show that diploma requirements
and standardized tests served a business necessity).
48. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977) ("[A] discriminatory
employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job
performance to survive a Title VII challenge.").
49. E.g., Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678 (using the "job related" term).
50. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 ("Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.").
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b. Segregated Social Networks
Another form of discrimination likely stems from the fact that "the
majority of jobs are found through personal referral."5 Thus, the jobs
with good pay go to those who can get a referral from someone who
already has such a job. Social networks segregated by race and gender
interact with this hiring choice and lead to segregation in employment as
52well as disparate information resources. This is a particularly stubborn
problem because employers have reason to rely on these social networks
in making hiring, promotion, and wage decisions: doing so can increase
employer profit by creating subgroups with different reservation wages."
A reservation wage is the lowest wage for which an employee would be
willing to do the job. If all employees were members of a single social
network and shared information about their wages, then the employer
would be unable to get away with paying some of the employees less
than other employees for the same work.
In practice, Employee A, once learning that Employee B
successfully negotiated a higher wage, would simply demand the higher
wage, knowing that the employer is willing to pay it. Suppose Employee
Q has the highest reservation wage of all the employees. She will not
work for less than ten dollars an hour, but the rest of the employees
would have worked for less, in amounts varying from eight to ten dollars
an hour. To retain Employee Q, the employer has to pay her ten dollars
an hour. Once the other employees find out, they will demand the same,
and may even call the employer's bluff: "If you pay me less than ten
dollars an hour, I will quit." So the employer will end up paying
everyone approximately ten dollars an hour, the maximum reservation
wage of all the workers. We can call this the unitary employee network
system.
However, if an employer can separate employees into smaller social
networks that share information internally but do not share information
51. Tavis Barr, With Friends Like These: Endogenous Labor Market Segregation
with Homogeneous, Nonprejudiced Agents, 68 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 703, 704 (2009)
(citing Betsey Stevenson, The Internet and Job Search (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res. Working
Paper No. 13886, 2008)).
52. E.g., James D. Montgomery, Social Networks and Labor Outcomes: Toward an
Economic Analysis, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1408, 1408 (1991) (modeling the effect of social
networks on wage dispersion, and "predict[ing] ... an increase in the density of social
ties or in social stratification by ability generates greater wage dispersion"); Antoni
Calv6-Armengol & Matthew 0. Jackson, The Effect of Social Networks on Employment
and Inequality, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 426 (2004); Yannis M. loannides & Linda Datcher
Loury, Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality, 42 J. ECON. LIT.
1056 (2004).




with each other, the employer can pay these groups at different rates.
We can call this the segregated employee network system. Under the
segregated system, each network will end up with the maximum
reservation wage of the employees in that network, but not the maximum
reservation wage across all networks. Say we have two networks at the
workplace, Group X and Group Y. Group X will end up with the
maximum reservation wage of the workers in Group X, since the person
with that maximum reservation wage within the group will tell the other
members. If someone in Group Y has a higher reservation wage than
anyone in Group X, and the employer pays that person the higher wage,
nobody in Group X will find out. Similarly, Group Y will end up with
the maximum reservation wage of the workers in Group Y, but if
someone in Group X is being paid more, the members of Group Y will
not know.5 5
One of these groups, say, Group X, will contain the employee with
the highest reservation wage of all the employees-this group will be
paid the same as it would have been paid under the unitary system.
However, the maximum reservation wage of the employees in Group Y
will be lower. Thus, these employees will get less than they would have
under the unitary system. The employer can now retain all the
employees even though it is paying everyone in Group Y less than it
would have in the unitary system. By permitting employers to pay
different workers at different rates, the segregated system increases the
profit of employers. Employers may not be responsible for creating
close social networks, but it's no wonder they are happy to let them
persist, and that they resist unionization, which would tend towards
merger of these networks.
There are less insidious reasons that employers rely on referrals and
social networks, too. If networks are segregated and closed enough, they
may permit employers to take advantage of workers policing each other
and punishing each other for shirking (by refusing a network member
any future referrals if he or she shirks on the job). Thus, they can lower
the costs of getting maximum productivity out of workers.
55. Even if someone in Group Y finds out, he may be reluctant to tell the other
members of Group Y, in the hopes of entering Group X himself. He may fear that
"blabbing" to Group Y could put his entrance into the better-off social network at risk.
Strong cultural norms in the US against talking about pay at work likely reinforce this
fear. See infra Part IV.A.
56. See Barr, supra note 51, at 706; EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems, 989
F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[A]n employee who refers someone for employment may
get in trouble with his employer if the person he refers is a dud; so word of mouth
recruitment in effect enlists existing employees to help screen new applicants
conscientiously.").
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While use of social networks for referrals can increase profits for
employers, it will have the impact of race, gender, and other disparities
in pay whenever social networks are relatively segregated with respect to
sex, race, and other protected characteristics. If the different reservation
prices different worker networks are willing to accept stem from
historical and societal discrimination, then employers are increasing
profit by exploiting that discrimination. Moreover, allowing employers
to exploit these differences can create "a poverty trap,"57 in which those
who start out with no money, and are therefore willing to work for low
wages, remain locked in low paying jobs, unable to get personal referrals
for the high paying jobs, or unable to find out that the employer is
willing to pay more and negotiate more aggressively.
It is unlikely, however, that exploitation of these differences would
be characterized as "intentional" discrimination under Title VII. The
practice of relying on social networks is facially neutral with respect to
race, sex, and other protected classes under Title VII, and the motivations
described above for relying on these networks constitute "legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons"58 under Title VII. Moreover, Title VII
explicitly states that it does not require employers to give preferential
treatment in order to cure de facto imbalanceS. 59
As a form of unintentional discrimination, it is unclear whether
these practices would be deemed to serve a "business necessity" or not.
To the extent employers use these practices to encourage employees to
police each other and be more productive, the employers' actions are
likely job related and serve a business necessity in the sense that they
improve productivity. To the extent these practices are being used to
break up information sharing groups and more finely target individual
employees' reservation wages, the result would probably depend on the
court. While one appellate court has affirmed that "subjective decision-
57. See Barr, supra note 51, at 732.
58. See, e.g., Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F.2d at 236 (finding that employer
use of word-of mouth hiring did not constitute intentional discrimination under Title VII
if the hiring method was "adopted because it is the most efficient," even with knowledge
that this "just happens to produce a work force whose racial or religious or ethnic or
national-origin or gender composition pleases the employer"); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (first stating the rule that a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination may be rebutted by the employer "articulat[ing] some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason").
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006) ("Nothing contained in this subchapter shall
be interpreted to require ... preferential treatment to any individual or to any group on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... in comparison with the
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community, State, section, or other area.").
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making criteria," including decisions to promote and decisions to
"apportion training opportunities," "carried out by a largely white
supervisory corps" can form the basis of a disparate impact claim,60 other
courts may reason that employers are not even engaged in a recognizable
"particular employment practice" 61 when they fail to integrate employee
social networks.62 These courts might hold that it is employees who have
chosen to segregate themselves into networks, or at the very least, that it
is social norms and practices outside of the workplace that have coerced
employees into doing so. 6 3
c. Failure of Employees to Negotiate Well
Another form of likely unintentional discrimination stems from the
fact that non-unionized employees, which amount to about 88.1% of the
US workforce, negotiate salaries, raises, and promotions individually
with their employers.64 Many, including those who study and critique
alternative dispute resolution, have documented weaker negotiation skills
on the part of women and minorities, or really anyone who has less
power than the party they are negotiating with. 5 As a result, negotiating
pay, promotions, and the like is difficult for all workers, but there is
reason to believe that women and minorities are particularly bad at it.
60. See McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 272, 277 (5th Cir. 2008).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(B) (explaining that to make out a disparate impact
claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must identify the "particular employment practice" that
causes the disparate impact, or the collection of such practices if they are not "capable of
separation for analysis").
62. Cf Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct 2541, 2554-55 (2011) (explaining
that although disparate impact claims based on subjective decision-making 'can' exist,"
this "does not lead to the conclusion that every employee in a company using a system of
discretion has such a claim in common. . . . Respondents have not identified a common
mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company.").
63. See Schultz, supra note 4 (identifying the widespread perception that workers
"bring to the workworld fixed preferences," citing numerous cases accepting this
argument as an explanation for sex segregation in the workplace, and arguing that
instead, workers preferences are not fixed, and that "employers structure opportunities
and incentives and maintain work cultures and relations" that influence those
preferences).
64. See Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell to a 70-year Low Last
Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/
22union.html (The rate of unionized employees has been falling, and in the private sector,
the rate of unionized employees is even lower-about 6.9%.).
65. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women,
100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1603-05 (1991); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,
1076-78 (1984); see also Babcock & Laschever, supra note 5 (summarizing some of the
studies documenting difficulty women have negotiating); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPNG
THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 139 (Harvard University
Press 2010) (describing how "lack of entitlement" amongst women and people of color
"translates into a failure to negotiate").
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Women and minorities may lack information due to being shut out of
social networks that provide this information. 66 They may also be taught
to value themselves less than dominant members of society value
themselves.67 Finally, women may be incentivized not to express their
own sense of self-worth, as this is considered inappropriate, unfeminine
68behavior for women.68 These expressions may also be considered
inappropriate behavior for some racial minorities.69 So, even when they
do stand up for themselves, they may be penalized for it.70 Of course,
weak negotiation skills and lack of information are common problems
for anyone in the "out-group." There is simply a correlation between
being in the out-group and being a woman or member of a racial
minority. Thus, negotiating individually with employees can have a
disparate impact on those with worse negotiation skills. As a form of
unintentional discrimination, it is once again unclear whether the practice
of negotiating individually with employees would be deemed to serve a
"business necessity" or not. Realistically, the practice of negotiating
individually with employees is so commonplace that it is unlikely courts
would use their authority to find that this practice does not serve a
business necessity, and therefore violates Title VII.
What drives this doctrinal debate about what does or does not
constitute actionable discrimination under Title VII is that the model in
which the employer is either entirely at fault or not at fault at all is
inaccurate in many of these cases. The model is particularly inaccurate
66. See sources cited supra note 52.
67. See Williams, supra note 65; Babcock & Laschever, supra note 5; Nicole
Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay
Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 190-95 (2011) (describing and
summarizing research finding women exhibiting low self-valuation and resulting poor
negotiation skills on their own behalf).
68. See Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Lei Lai, It Depends Who Is Asking
and Who You Ask: Social Incentives for Sex Differences in the Propensity to Initiate
Negotiation (Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Working Paper No. RWPO5-045, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=779506## (conducting an experiment
and finding that women were penalized by men but not women for trying to negotiate
salary, and that "perceptions of niceness and demandingness" influenced results); see
also sources cited supra note 67.
69. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1895, 1911-12 (2007) (describing efforts that Black women may make to "avoid the
perception that they are . . . 'angry black women'); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati,
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1259, 1282 at n.54, 1283 at n.60 (2000)
(describing stereotype of Blacks as aggressive and difficulties faculty members have in
negotiating the distorted perceptions of their behavior that this can cause).
70. See sources cited supra note 69.
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in the case of reliance on referrals, inaction in the face of segregated
social networks, and decisions to negotiate with employees individually.
In these instances, if the employer is deemed entirely at fault and
branded as a "discriminator,"71 this neglects the fact that past and societal
discrimination are major contributing factors. If the employer is deemed
entirely without fault, this neglects the fact that employers are profiting
from the past and societal discrimination, and that this is part of why they
resist changing pay, hiring, referral, and negotiation practices in ways
that would integrate segregated networks.
Similarly, employees are neither entirely to blame, nor are they
entirely without blame. Just as employers profit from segregated social
networks and the socialization of employees not to negotiate, employees
are in some instances gaining forms of utility by conforming to social
expectations. For instance, employees may gain a sort of "identity
utility" by performing in conformist ways-a woman sticking to a job
that has been coded as "female," a Latino worker sticking to a largely
Latino social network, or an African American woman behaving
"modestly" and not asking for a raise.72 Sometimes identity utility even
translates into traditional monetary utility. For instance, a woman may
perform her femininity, in part by sticking to a poorly paid "female" job,
in order to reduce the odds that her husband, whose income she shares,
will divorce her. The husband, who one might think is irrational for
implicitly encouraging his wife to make less money, may be gaining
identity utility by reinforcing the privileged status of men generally.
This identity utility may even pay off for him in the long run financially,
by helping to sustain a system of sex discrimination in wages, in which
he makes more money than he otherwise would.7 3 Angela Onwuachi-
Willig has described how "[b]eing the target of certain kinds of race
discrimination can be understood, in a perverse way, as a matter of
'choice,' 74 a kind of "volunteer discrimination."75 She explains how
African Americans sometimes engage in "accommodating" racially
subordinating norms in order to personally advance. 76 Some may also
engage in "distancing . . . from other racial outsiders" for the same
reason, and others may engage in "resigned modeling ... for the sake of
serving as role models to those in their group who may look up to
71. See Shin, supra note 7; Bartlett, supra note 8.
72. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q. J.
EcoN. 715, 717, 732-40 (2000) (articulating the concept of "identity utility" and
providing similar examples).
73. See id. at 733 n.36.
74. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 69, at 1895.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1898.
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them."77 On the other hand, all these choices are made in the context of
sometimes extreme social and financial pressures.
The fact that responsibility for these problems is widespread may
make us hesitant to punish employers who take advantage of historical
and societal discrimination, but that does not mean we must treat
employers as if they have a right to take advantage of such
discrimination. There is a compromise, and it is readily available within
the structure of our civil rights laws. We can still use Title VII to
incentivize employers and employees to take steps to integrate these
segregated social networks and ask for fair pay. If tools and an impetus
could be provided for workers to infiltrate and integrate race and gender
based social networks, this would serve the ultimate goal of equal
employment opportunity, and the cost to employers-that they can no
longer profit from the discrimination of others by paying some
employees less than others for the same work-would be just. As I
argue below, pay transparency can provide that impetus by opening
disadvantaged workers' eyes to the financial benefits they would receive
if they broadened their social networks beyond segregated gender and
race groups, behaved in ways they have been socialized to resist, such as
aggressively negotiating, and aimed for jobs they have been socialized to
resist, but which have better long-term career potential. It can also
provide the information required for workers to change their reservation
prices.
III. How PAY TRANSPARENCY CAN HELP
In this part, I will argue that incentivizing pay transparency would
potentially help reduce discrimination, both intentional and
unintentional. There is empirical and theoretical support for this thesis.
77. Id.
78. Pay transparency could also help promote the principles underlying other forms
of labor regulation, such as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), and state wage and hour laws. As the Supreme Court has noted,
"[flew topics are of such immediate concern to employees as the level of their wages."
Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 569 (1978). Thus, pay transparency can help
employees obtain information that triggers collective action where needed. Indeed,
discussions of pay among employees are often protected by the NLRA for this reason.
See Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Pay Secrecy/Confidentiality Rules and the National
Labor Relations Act, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. LAW 121, 125 (2003) (citing survey finding
that only about 10% of employers had "actively adopted" pay transparency, and that
"over one-third of private sector employers" had rules "prohibiting employees from
discussing their [wages]," despite most of these rules likely violating the NLRA).
Access to wage information would also help enforce the FLSA and analogous wage
and hour laws because it would provide the information necessary to determine that a
class action is warranted against employers engaged in rampant violations.
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A. Empirical Evidence
Pay transparency is more common in state employment and at
unionized workplaces than in non-unionized private employment, and
many studies have documented reduced wage disparities on the basis of
race and gender in such workplaces. For instance, "[t]he gender wage
gap for all full-time workers, based on median annual earnings, is 23
percent. In the federal government, where pay rates are transparent and
publicly available, the gender wage gap is only 11 percent." 79
Another study found that "market structure-driven discrimination of
managers in highly unionized industries" is reduced as compared to low-
union density industries. The authors proposed that this "stems from
standardized, more racially equitable wages of union workers."80
Yet another study found that gender-based wage gaps were
"significantly smaller in unionized establishments for six of [nine]
industries" studied. In one industry (miscellaneous plastics), there was
no significant effect of unionization on gender-based wage gaps. In two
(textile dyeing and finishing men's and boy's shirts), there was a
significant but negative effect on women's wages. The authors
determined "that unionization generally reduces wage inequality between
blue-collar men and women, but the effect might be contingent both on
the overall proportion of women in an industry and on union
characteristics."' Interestingly, the two industries for which
unionization was associated with a significant but negative effect are
traditionally female industries. These findings, combined with social
network theory, may lend support to the hypothesis that the pay
transparency and standardization that often comes with unionizing is
beneficial to women in industries where their exclusion from the better-
paid networks of workers is a major contributor to the wage disparities
they experience.
There is even some evidence that women and racial minorities
gravitate to workplaces with pay transparency, perhaps because they get
relatively better compensation in these workplaces for comparable jobs.
One study found that not only are women "overrepresented in state
government employment relative to their civilian labor force
representation within a state," "private sector race and sex-based wage
79. Ariane Hegewisch, et al., Pay Secrecy and Wage Discrimination 3 (Inst. for
Women's Policy Research, Fact Sheet No. C382, June 2011).
80. Jacqueline Agesa & Richard U. Agesa, Market Structure-Driven Discrimination
and the Earnings of Subordinate Managers: An Analysis by Union Density, 30 J. Post-
Keynesian Econ. 205, 205 (2007).
81. Marta M. Elvira & Ishak Saporta, How Does Collective Bargaining Affect the
Gender Pay Gap?, 28 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 469, 469, 480-81 (2001).
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differentials, relative to those in the public sector, are positively
associated with the representation of women, African-Americans, and
Latinos in state government workforces." 82
Piece work-being paid based on the number of products produced,
rather than by the hours or months worked-is another example of
employment which, while often extremely low paid, may involve high
pay transparency, if the rate per product is relatively uniform across
employees. One study concluded that women disproportionately work
on piece rates (paid by the number of products produced) in part based
on a belief that "they are subject to less wage discrimination when
objective performance measures are available." The authors of this study
may not have considered the full panoply of reasons women gravitate to
piece work, but they did find that piece work was associated with
reduced amounts of unexplained wage gaps between men and women.
Finally, in his study of race, gender, national origin, and
performance evaluations at a large service-sector company, Emilio
Castilla discovered that once factors like performance evaluations,
turnover, and part time status were taken into account, race and gender
did not significantly influence initial salaries or whether a salary increase
was awarded to an employee (although national origin did).84 However,
race and gender did significantly impact the size of salary increases.
Castilla hypothesized varying levels of transparency, and therefore
information awareness, at the various stages of work as a possible
explanation:
I find that ascriptive bias exists only in the less formalized second
stage . .. where administrators are not accountable for their decisions
regarding the amounts of salary increases. . . . My findings that the
most visible aspects of employee career outcomes-such as salary
increases (regardless of quantity) and promotions-are not subject to
the performance-reward bias process . . . is in contrast to the finding
that females and minorities are then disadvantaged when it comes to
decisions about the amount by which their compensation is increased
every year, which is typically unobservable or unknown to the rest of
employees. The invisibility of salary increase amounts eliminates
concrete salary comparisons among employees and thus has the
82. Jared J. Llorens, Jeffrey B. Wenger & J. Edward Kellough, Choosing Public
Sector Employment: The Impact of Wages on the Representation of Women and
Minorities in State Bureaucracies, J. PuB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 397 (2007).
83. Uwe Jirjahn & Gesine Stephan, Gender, Piece Rates and Wages: Evidence from
Matched Employer-Employee Data, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECoN. 683, 683 (2004).
84. Castilla, supra note 20, at 1503.
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potential to mask unfairness in the performance-compensation link in
organizations."
B. Theoretical Support
Of course, the correlation between pay transparency and reduced
wage disparities does not necessarily mean transparency causes the
reduced disparities. However, there are a number of theoretical reasons
to support an inference of causation.
First, pay transparency could help tip off the people "closer to the
ground," who may be in a better position than a high-level manager to
detect suspicious wage disparities, such as the ones in the Ledbetter case,
whether those disparities result from intentional or unintentional
discrimination. Pay transparency can also deter supervisors from
discriminating in the first place, knowing that decisions will be on
display for all the subordinates to see. If A got a raise and B did not, but
B worked much harder and smarter, B, and his colleagues, will be
suspicious of the supervisor's motives, and may question them.
Of course, people are human, and may sometimes overestimate their
own qualities and merits as compared to their colleagues, but that doesn't
mean that every time an employee deems a disparity to be unjustified, he
or she is wrong. Sometimes the disparity is justified and sometimes it is
not. Without some level of pay transparency, the disparity never even
gets unearthed to those who have a basis for deeming it justified or not.
Moreover, employees may not be so bad at soberly assessing their own
performance when asked to get in the habit of doing so, and when they
have to do so with others watching. One real life experiment in which
employees were permitted to set their own pay, and where coworkers
could see what they gave themselves, concluded that the employees
86tended to set their pay quite fairly. Imagine yourself in a scenario of
pay transparency: Would you really complain about making less money
than your colleague when you know deep down-and everyone else at
work does, too-that he works harder than you? And that if you
successfully get an unwarranted raise, everyone else will know? Instead,
you might feel motivated to work harder, seeing that if you do, you'll
actually be rewarded as he was-a fact you were never really sure of
until you saw the dollar amounts.
Second, pay transparency can lead to pay uniformity. Because
employers are fearful that paying employees different wages, and letting
85. Id. at 1515-16.
86. Tammy Erickson, Should Your Coworkers Know How Much You Make?
HARVARD Bus. REVIEW BLOG (Apr. 25, 2009), blogs.hbr.org/erickson/2009/04/should_
i knowhowmuch_you mak.html.
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them know about it, will lead to dissension and hurt feelings, there may
be a tendency towards more objective, uniform measures for setting pay
rates under systems of transparency. Indeed, this has been provided as a
reason why employers may resist compliance with the NLRA, which
requires them to permit employees to discuss their pay with each other.87
As I will argue below, this tendency towards uniformity may be
misguided. 8 Non-uniform pay in a system of pay transparency may be
one of the best ways to incentivize good performance. But to the extent
pay transparency promotes uniformity of pay, uniformity is the flip side
of discretion, and as discretion is reduced, the opportunity for intentional
discrimination narrows.
Third, the weak negotiation practices of women, minorities, and
anyone in the "out-group" would be mitigated by pay transparency. 89
Pay transparency cures much of the information disparity between
employees. Members of out-groups could determine what is normal pay,
at least at that employer, by simply looking at the numbers. Members
could also feel more confident negotiating for better pay, knowing what
everyone else is getting. They could also become aware of jobs and
career tracks that provide more potential for advancement and raises in
the long run. Women in particular may overcome gendered socialization
and seek to transfer into jobs with better long term potential, if made
87. Gely & Bierman, supra note 78. The proposed Paycheck Fairness Act also
would have prohibited retaliation against employees who talk about their pay with each
other. H.R. 1338, 110"h Cong. § 3(b)(1)(B) (Aug. 1, 2008).
88. See infra Part IV.B.
89. Deborah Eisenberg has encouraged a different kind of pay transparency on
similar grounds. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-
Based Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2011); Deborah
Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act's Glass Ceiling, 63 S.M.U. L. REV. 17, 63-67
(2010). Eisenberg does not encourage transparency in the sense I do-internal workplace
transparency that would permit employees to look up the wages and salaries of their
fellow employees, identified by name. Rather, she promotes the use of pay scales and
clear standards for setting compensation, as well as disclosure of salary "band"
information. This could be a start, but it might lead to more pay uniformity than is ideal
for many businesses. See infra Part IV.B. In the alternative, if a very large range of
salaries is permitted for a particular pay grade, so that pay need not be uniform, then
disclosing the pay scale would be insufficient to provide notice to employees of unfair
compensation decisions occurring within those ranges. Indeed, some form of pay scales
and performance evaluations were used at Goodyear Tire to determine compensation,
including raises, but Lilly Ledbetter was still subject to wage discrimination,
unbeknownst to her. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 659
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that "Ledbetter's pay, during a particular
one-year period, fell below Goodyear's minimum threshold for her position," and that
Goodyear attempted to explain the disparities based on poor performance). These
reasons may be why Eisenberg encourages employers to use and disclose pay scales, but
does not go so far as to propose any kind of legal mandate or incentive to do so.
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aware of the differences in salary potential between jobs that have been
traditionally gendered female, and those traditionally gendered male.
IV. THE COSTS OF PAY TRANSPARENCY
In this Part, I consider the costs of pay transparency. As this Part
will show, most of the costs perceived to stem from pay transparency are
costs to the employer, not to employees. More importantly, most of
these costs are not costs in the form of reduced productivity, but costs in
the form of a different allocation of profits between employer and
employees.90 We should not hesitate to incentivize reforms that reduce
discrimination merely because they will lead to a different allocation of
profits, because that is not a social cost. Only one potential cost-
reduced ability to incentivize good performance-represents a true social
cost, in that it is a potential cost in the form of reduced productivity.
However, even this cost may be far rarer than it is often perceived to
be.91
A. Social Discomfort
The NLRA already secures the right of workers to tell each other
how much money they make. 92 Employers cannot stop them from doing
this, even though a number of employers have formal policies that claim
to do so, and which are in clear violation of the law, as other authors
have pointed out.93
But even with this legal protection, most employees don't tell each
other what they make. Some employees mistakenly believe they can't,
and very few private employers volunteer the information rather than
forcing employees to disclose it to each other if they want to know.94
90. See infra Part IV.C.
91. See infra Part IV.B.
92. See, e.g., Jeannette Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 532 F.2d 916, 918 (3d Cir. 1976) ("It is
obvious that higher wages are a frequent objective of organizational activity, and
discussions about wages are necessary to further that goal. The right of self-organization
depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages of self-
organization from others. That is not to say that every wage discussion is protected
activity. It is sufficient for finding the rule prima facie violative of section 8(a)(1) to note
that wage discussions can be protected activity and that an employer's unqualified rule
barring such discussions has the tendency to inhibit such activity.") (citations and internal
quotations omitted) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. §157 (2006), which states: "Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, . . . to engage in r] concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . .").
93. Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No
Way": Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168-
69 (2004); Gely & Bierman, supra note 78, at 128.
94. Bierman & Gely, supra note 93, at 171 (citing survey finding that only about
10% of employers had "actively adopted" pay transparency, and that "over one-third of
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One reason this workplace right may be so flagrantly violated and so
underexercised is simply cultural. This is one of the few perceived costs
to pay transparency that can be thought of as a cost to employees, rather
than employers.
People in the United States often think it is dirty to talk about
money. They associate money with status, and it is impolite to talk about
status, or reveal it overtly. Thus, pay transparency may simply make
some people uncomfortable. But this kind of awkward discomfort is not
a sufficiently persuasive argument against pay transparency in the face of
discrimination. If we have a solution that could reduce discrimination,
we should use it. Moreover, if pay transparency were more common,
cultural discomfort with people making different amounts of money
would likely be mitigated somewhat.
Indeed, this is exactly the kind of malleable social norm that the
Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause have successfully been
able to alter in the past. The arguments of those who sought to rely on
social prejudices to justify employment and public accommodations
discrimination, as well as family law discrimination against interracial
couples, were soundly rejected. 96 This rejection is widely seen as a wise
and courageous move that prevented prevalent social norms from
undermining antidiscrimination law altogether. Instead,
antidiscrimination law altered the social norms. It is no longer the norm
to say prejudiced and injurious things to children being raised by
interracial couples, for Whites to refuse to eat in the same dining room as
African Americans, or for airline customers to prefer to be served by
female flight attendants.
private sector employers" had rules "prohibiting employees from discussing their wages,"
despite most of these rules likely violating the NLRA).
95. Id at 175 ("[A] 'code of silence' exists with respect to the issue of pay in a large
number of workplaces throughout the country. The social norms behind the
establishment of these codes of silence are strong, and the potential consequences of
breaching these norms are seen by many as being serious."); see also Ray Fisman, How
Much Do You Think He Makes?: Does Knowing Your Colleagues' Salaries Make You
Happy or Disgruntled?, SLATE (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2268886/.
96. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 297 (1964) (applying the Civil
Rights Act to a restaurant that discriminated against African American customers, despite
district court finding that "if [the restaurant] were required to serve Negroes it would lose
a substantial amount of business"); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (finding
removal of an infant from mother's custody after she married an African American man
to be unconstitutional, despite the "reality of private biases and the possible injury they
might inflict" on the child); Diaz v. Pan-American Airlines, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.
1971) ("While we recognize that the public's expectation of finding one sex in a
particular role may cause some initial difficulty, it would be totally anomalous if we were
to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex
discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act
was meant to overcome.").
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B. Disgruntled Employees and Uniform Pay
Another perceived cost of pay transparency is that when employees
know what everyone is making, disgruntled employees will be more
common. A recent study at UC Berkeley informed employees of an
easily accessible website that they could use to look up their colleagues'
public salaries. Those employees who used the website and had below
median salaries for their "pay unit and occupation" had decreased job
satisfaction and increased likelihood of looking for a new job. Those
with above median salaries reported no change in job satisfaction.97
One response to this cost is to make pay more uniform, to avoid
creating unhappy employees. Many employers assume that making pay
uniform is itself a cost, believing that with more uniform pay, employees
cannot be incentivized to perform better through the prospect of better
pay. This assumption may not be true in all cases. Indeed, team-based
performance assessment and incentive pay may, in some workplaces,
provide superior results to individual-employee-based merit pay.98 Just
as more uniform pay for units and jobs can lead to freeriding, too much
individualized competition for pay can lead to selfish behavior that is not
targeted at group productivity and firm wide outcomes. 99
For those environments where healthy competition between
employees really is the ideal approach, employers should not assume that
pay transparency makes it impossible to have merit pay, nor should they
assume that employee expressions of unhappiness are unwarranted.
Employees may feel disgruntled about other employees making more
than them because they feel the disparity is not truly merit based. If
employees thought the disparity were fair, they would have no reason to
seek another job. The impetus to seek another job stems from the sense
that the disparity does not reflect merit. In many cases, the employees
are probably right, given the fact that membership in valuable social
networks and negotiating skills affect pay.
There is evidence that employees are in fact quite comfortable with
merit pay when it is substantively and, importantly, procedurally fair.
Procedural justice is the sense that the process used is fair. Studies
"suggest that procedural information is used as a heuristic, i.e., serves as
97. David Card, Alexandre Mas, Enrico Moretti & Emmanuel Saez, Inequality at
Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction (NBER Working Paper No. 16396
Sept. 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16396.
98. Phyllis A. Siegel & Donald C. Hambrick, Pay Disparities Within Top
Management Groups: Evidence of Harmful Effects on Performance of High-Technology
Firms, 15 Org. Sci. 259, 267 (2005).
99. Id. at 261-264.
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a substitute for unclear or missing information on outcomes fairness."100
In other words, employees, like employers, may not be entirely sure that
their pay is fair. An employee might not know if her colleague makes
more because she works harder, or if she makes more because she is
attractive. She's not sure whether the colleague works harder or not.
However, she may not jump to the conclusion that the pay is unfair if she
has reason to guess that the procedures by which the salaries have been
determined are fair.
In the salary context, researchers seeking to define the
characteristics that lead to a sense of procedural justice have identified
four major standards: "1. Accuracy of information about work content;
2. Relevance of evaluation criteria; 3. Consistency of application; and
4. Objectivity of the evaluation process."' 0 There are a number of ways
employers can provide more of a sense of procedural justice. One is
transparency itself.102 Another major factor employers can control is the
characteristics of the decision makers-their perceived objectivity and
accuracy. o3 Employers can also recruit employee participation in the
"process of information gathering, and by asking them to validate their
job description." They could also institute more finely grained
performance evaluations.
Managers and scholars of business are now starting to acknowledge
that when some form of procedural justice exists, transparent pay can be
non-uniform. Moreover, it can actually incentivize good work, since it
encourages substantively fair compensation, with higher compensation
visibly going to those who perform more and better work, not to those
who happen to have better negotiating skills.' 04 Employees often suspect
that some people get more pay for reasons unrelated to merit-they are
friends with the right people, attractive, pushy, etc. Employers often
claim that they could not reward merit under a system of pay
transparency, but pay transparency, if combined with merit pay, could
actually incentivize employees even more than an opaque system of
merit pay does. With pay transparency, employers can show employees
that merit really is rewarded, and supervisors can be better encouraged to
reward true merit, rather than unfairly enriching their friends.
100. Julie Cloutier & Lars Vilhuber, Procedural Justice Criteria in Salary
Determination, 23 J. Managerial Psych. 713, 733 (2008).
101. Id. at 716.
102. Id. at 731.
103. Id. at 731-33.
104. Tammy Erickson, Should Your Coworkers Know How Much You Make?,
HARVARD BusrNEss REvIEW BLOG (Apr. 25, 2009, 9:27 p.m.), http://blogs.hbr.org/
erickson/2009/04/should i know how much_you-mak.html.
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Indeed, one author has gone so far as to promote letting employees
set their own pay (under the watchful eye of their colleagues) as the next
step.10 5  At least one experiment with this process has found that
employees tend to set their own pay quite fairly in these
circumstances. 06
Another response to the cost of disgruntled employees is to treat all
workers better. For instance, law professors at public universities make
wildly different amounts of money. At one UC law school, for instance,
in 2008 there were professors making in the mid-$100,000s range and
some making in the mid-$300,000s range. The differences cannot be
attributed solely to seniority.'07  These salaries are public, and while
there is probably some irritation about these salary differences, the fact
that many of these professors have tenure, and that all of them are quite
well-paid, must help mitigate the irritation greatly. Once employers treat
all employees well, they can go out of their way to reward some
employees who are particularly high performing with much greater ease.
While some employers may not like this solution because it costs money,
an incentive to treat all employees better while reducing pay disparities
that lack a basis in merit is one that we should not hesitate over.
There may be some employers for whom pay transparency, even
when used in conjunction with the more innovative management
practices described above, does hurt productivity by reducing employer
ability to incentivize high quality performance in workers. However, we
must weigh this cost against the benefits of reduced discrimination that
pay transparency would provide, keeping in mind the massive wage gaps
documented for women and racial minorities, as well as the fact that
some substantial portion of these gaps appears explained by unjust
discrimination (intentional and unintentional).
In order to mitigate (but of course not completely eradicate) the
potential cost to productivity, my proposal does not make pay
transparency mandatory, and my proposal links the incentive to institute
pay transparency to employers' self-perceived risk of liability for pay
discrimination. Through these two elements, the proposal will better
target: 1) Those employers who, by their own calculations, are more
likely permitting rampant wage discrimination to go unremedied; and
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. One can search State Worker Salary Search, SACRAMENTO BEE,
http://www.sacbee.com/statepay, to find salaries, with names identified. Those who are
familiar with the professors at a particular UC law school will be able to confirm through
casual searching that seniority does not appear to be a sufficient explanation for the salary
disparities.
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2) Those employers who, by their own calculations, will experience
lower rather than higher pay transparency-related costs.
C. Loss ofEmployer Information Advantage
Another cost of pay transparency to employers may be the loss of
information advantages that many of them currently enjoy. Knowing
what other workers make would be an advantage to all employees in
negotiating salary. While workers can look up so-called market wages
for various jobs, there are actually huge ranges of market wages for most
jobs.' Thus, it is hard for employees to know what an employer really
is willing to pay for a particular job. Under a system of pay
transparency, many employers should expect employees' salaries to go
up, as they will be better equipped to negotiate with the employer.
The benefits of procedural justice and incentives to perform well
may outweigh the cost of employers losing their current information
advantage. However, it is likely that in some cases, these benefits to the
employer will not outweigh the costs of losing an information advantage.
Nevertheless, this is not a cost to the employer that also represents a
social cost, in the form of lost productivity. Instead, it is a cost in the
form of a reduced share in profits, with more profits allocated to
employees.
Nevertheless, some readers may be concerned that a shift in profit
share from employers to employees will discourage business activity
generally. Because I propose incentivizing pay transparency rather than
mandating it, in cases where the loss of employer profit share is so severe
as to discourage the firm from doing business at all, the employer need
not embrace pay transparency. Such an employer could still defend
against claims of pay discrimination in the ways it currently can: by
rebutting the plaintiffs evidence of intentional discrimination with
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons"' 09 for compensation decisions,
and by proving that practices having a disparate impact on pay serve a
business necessity."l0 Moreover, it is the employer's self-assessment of
the costs of pay transparency as compared to the benefits-reduced
liability for pay discrimination-that will determine whether the
employer embraces pay transparency or not. This means that pay
transparency will be embraced more often in circumstances where it
108. Marlene Kim, Employers' Estimates of Market Wages: Implications for Wage
Discrimination in the US., 6 FEMINIST EcoN. 97, 98-100 (2000).
109. See supra notes 40, 58 (explaining this method of rebutting claims of intentional
discrimination under Title VII).
110. See supra notes 18, 45-50 and accompanying text (explaining this method of
defending against claims of unintentional discrimination under Title VII).
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would be socially efficient to do so-where the employer's own
assessment of the risk that it is discriminating is high, in comparison to
the employer's assessment of the cost of losing an information
advantage.
D. Internalizing the Cost ofDiscrimination
The benefits to the employer will not outweigh the costs of pay
transparency in all cases, in particular, those where the cost of losing an
information advantage is high. However, when we add on reduced
liability for discrimination, many employers may well find that pay
transparency is worth it. Some may not. But given that the benefits to
employers of pay transparency may be underappreciated currently, the
nudge of a change in Title VII may help employers consider ways of
rewarding and incentivizing employees that are both substantively and
procedurally more fair.
More importantly, we should require employers, in making that
calculation, to fully internalize the cost of discrimination that is
facilitated and masked by not providing pay transparency. That is why I
propose getting rid of the two-year cap on backpay for pay
discrimination claims. Because I propose that we merely incentivize
employers to provide pay transparency, with the carrot of an affirmative
defense or safe harbor, employers that believe these costs are simply too
great need not incur them. However, we should at least nudge employers
to consider the benefits, in particular by forcing them to internalize the
social costs of their own behavior-at least that behavior which could
plausibly violate Title VII.
V. THE ELEMENTS OF THE PAY TRANSPARENCY DEFENSE
As explained above, I propose a pay transparency defense or safe
harbor. Under the affirmative defense version of the proposal, employers
could establish an affirmative defense to vicarious liability for pay
discrimination. Under the safe harbor version, the carrot for the
employer would be even stronger. Establishing that one falls within the
safe harbor would be sufficient grounds for dismissal of the pay
discrimination claims, and moving for dismissal on this basis would be
sufficient for staying discovery during consideration of the motion.
Thus, under the safe harbor version, employers would not only have a
defense to the pay discrimination claims, they could avoid discovery on
them.
Under either version, there would be two elements required to
establish the defense or safe harbor: (1) the employer made salaries
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internally transparent and (2) the employee failed to voice objections to
any suspected or alleged discrimination in a timely fashion.
In this part, I first provide examples of these two options-the
"reasonable care" affirmative defense to sexual harassment liability
under Title VII and the "safe harbor" from European Commission data
privacy law. I then provide details of what would be sufficient to
establish the elements of the defense or safe harbor.
A. The Legal Incentive for Employers to Embrace Pay Transparency
A variety of legal incentives in the form of reduced liability for
discrimination could be used to incentivize employers to embrace pay
transparency. For instance, employers could obtain an affirmative
defense to liability if they institute pay transparency, similar to the
"reasonable care" defense for most forms of harassment liability under
Title VII.
The reasonable care defense is a judge-made defense to Title VII
harassment liability, created as a way of resolving the difficult question
of when employers should be liable for the harassment of an employee
by other employees, including supervisors."' Employees who engage in
harassment, indeed, employees who engage in any form of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, are often acting in defiance of
company policy prohibiting discrimination.' 12 But in the case of hostile
work environment harassment, the employer often lacks actual or
constructive notice that the harasser is engaged in the discriminatory
activity, especially when the victim of the harassment does not raise
concerns.113 If the harassment occurs and nobody in the position to do
something about it knows about it, it seems unfair to some to impute
liability to the employer.
On the other hand, when the harasser has supervisory authority, it is
arguably the authority that has been delegated to the supervisor that
facilitates his or her engaging in harassment. Some argue that the
111. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998); Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 777-78 (1989).
112. For example, this is a point made in Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 WL
100, at *6 (D.D.C. 1980) (describing harassers, who are "gratify[ing their] own desires"
despite a nondiscrimination policy as thereby distinguished from cab drivers who hit
pedestrians despite the company's safety policy, and for whose actions employers are
liable through the doctrine of respondeat superior). Vinson v. Taylor was eventually
overturned in Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), one of the early Supreme Court
cases on vicarious liability for supervisor harassment.
113. The district court in Vinson v. Taylor made the point that the victim did not
complain, and argued that notice to the harasser did not equate to notice to the employer.
Vinson v. Taylor, 1980 WL 100, at *7.
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employer ought to be strictly liable in this case as a result,1 4 just as the
employer would be liable if a supervisor fired someone for
discriminatory reasons, in defiance of company policy. Moreover, the
employer is arguably in the best position to create the circumstances in
which the harassment will be reported and promptly responded to.' 15
Employers, and not employees, are in the position to create a clear
avenue for reporting harassment without fear of retaliation by both
supervisors and coworkers, and employers are in the position to respond
promptly." 6
This dilemma is similar to one often faced in pay discrimination.
Supervisors are frequently delegated authority to evaluate employees,
recommend raises, and negotiate salaries. They may exercise that
authority in a discriminatory manner (both intentionally and
unintentionally). When the supervisor violates Title VII, especially if he
or she does so unintentionally, the employer may not be aware. On the
other hand, the employer is in the best position to structure the workplace
in ways that unearth the discrimination.
In the case of harassment, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually
created an affirmative defense to liability for supervisor harassment, the
elements of which encourage employers to take positive steps to prevent
and remedy harassment, and encourage employees to provide notice to
the employer of the harassment early on. "The defense comprises two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise."1 7
In response to this legal development, numerous employers have
taken steps to prevent harassment, as well as to speed up discovery when
it does take place. Employers have spent the time, and massive amounts
of money, to educate employees about discriminatory harassment and the
fact that it violates the law.' 18 They have also created avenues for
114. This is the position that the appellate court took in Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d
141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1985). It was also the position of Justice Marshall in Meritor v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 76-77.
115. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d at 151.
116. Id.
117. Id.at:807.
118. Even a few days after the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, the L.A. Times noted
that the sexual harassment training industry was already large. Stuart Silverstein, Fear of
Lawsuits Spurs the Birth of New Industry, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1998,
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jun/27/news/mn-64125 ("[The industry's] size isn't
known, but the annual revenue is believed to be in the billions."). This was probably
prompted by Meritor v. Vinson itself. Ellerth/Faragher only increased the incentive.
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employees who are the victims of harassment to report it, even when it is
being committed by their supervisor, or by coworkers. If anything, some
have argued that employers have gone too far, trampling on the interests
of both complainants"' 9 and alleged harassers,12 0 and on the interests of
all in open, "unsanitized" workplaces where they feel free to date
coworkers, relax and have sexual conversation.' 2 1
An affirmative defense to or safe harbor from pay discrimination
that is structured to prevent and unearth the discrimination could
similarly incentivize employers to act. Pay transparency deters
discrimination by exposing it to employees who are victims, and
unearths discrimination by letting employees know when they are being
paid far less than their colleagues who do the same quality of work.
However, the costs of taking reasonable care to prevent and remedy
harassment may be less than the costs of embracing pay transparency.
The cultural shift may also be greater with embracing pay transparency.
Nevertheless, the benefits to society could be massive. Pay transparency
could undo "poverty traps" rooted in historical discrimination and social
segregation. It could also incentivize women and people of color to
resist socialization that encourages them to take career paths and
strategies that are ultimately less financially rewarding. Making clear
just how much more money one would make in the long run in that
stereotypically male job could help make people's choices in
employment better informed.
Given this benefit, and given that most of the costs of pay
transparency represent a shift in profit sharing away from employer to
employee, rather than a social cost in the form of less productivity, it
might be worth giving employers an even stronger incentive. For
instance, we might provide employers with a safe harbor, modeled
loosely on an arrangement between the U.S. Department of Commerce
and the European Union (E.U.) for protecting the safety of personal data
removed from the E.U.122 Under the arrangement, organizations in the
U.S. that voluntarily commit to a set of principles designed to protect the
personal data of individuals are in the safe harbor.12 3 All complaints that
an E.U. citizen's data is not properly protected go to an independent
119. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable
Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 125, 130-31 (2002).
120. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW 182 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003).
121. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003).
122. Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission,
65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Principles]; European
Commission Directive 2000/520/EC (July 26, 2000).
123. Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 122, at 45,666.
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arbitrator, one that the U.S. organization was allowed to choose when it
committed to the safe harbor principles.12 4 Thus, companies that commit
to the safe harbor principles are essentially getting compelled arbitration
without the complainant even having signed an arbitration agreement.
Of course, companies have to do something in exchange for this benefit.
The safe harbor principles with which the committed companies must
comply are reasonably stringent.125
We could imagine a similarly strong carrot for employers to
embrace pay transparency if the affirmative defense is deemed
insufficient. Employers who prove that they provided sufficient pay
transparency and that the plaintiff did not timely complain of pay
discrimination, as described below, could get not just summary
judgment, but dismissal of the claims of pay discrimination. This is a
massive benefit, as it cuts off discovery, but encouraging this type of step
to reduce pay discrimination before the discrimination starts may be just
the type of reform needed to make Title VII provide fairness for all,
rather than the lucky few who somehow discover quickly that they've
been the victim of discrimination.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the following is a model of how
the two general elements of the safe harbor or affirmative defense may
be operationalized doctrinally.
B. What Constitutes Sufficient Internal Transparency
To satisfy element (1), an employer should have had in place, at the
time the employee alleges he or she was paid a discriminatory paycheck,
disclosure of salaries, hourly and overtime wages, piece rates, bonuses or
grants awarded in the prior pay period, and any fees charged by the
employee to the employer in the prior pay period for additional
independent contracting work, such as consulting.
Employers would not have to disclose the fees generally paid to
independent contractors, but they would have to disclose when those
contractors also happen to be current employees.
Disclosure would have to be made to all employees working for the
same employer, but not to the public or to employees working for
subsidiaries. Disclosure would have to be distributed in a form that is
"easily accessible" to employees, and employees would have to be
notified of the disclosure system and the fact that failure to complain
about unfair pay in a timely fashion would forfeit their claims. The
124. Id. at 45,668 (section on enforcement).
125. Id.
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employer would bear the burden to prove that the system was in place
and sufficient.
One example of a qualifying disclosure system would be
distribution of the information via a website accessible to employees, as
long as there are enough internet-enabled computers at work for
employees to use without having to wait in long lines, and as long as
employees are permitted to use them before or after work hours. In
workplaces where this is not practical, another example of a sufficient
disclosure system would be distribution of a booklet on a monthly basis
containing the disclosures. Given that liability for the entire claim of pay
discrimination could be avoided through distribution of the booklet and
failure of the employee to complain in a timely fashion, the booklet
would need to be signed for, in order to show that the employee actually
received it in any given month. Employers could protect themselves
from disputes about whether a website was up and running by keeping a
record of successful employee logins, and showing that successful logins
occurred regularly during the time period at issue. Employers could even
assign an employee to login and ensure the website is functioning once a
week.
Employers would have to disclose the pay data across the company,
anonymized if they wish. However, if the information is anonymized,
employers would have to make a second disclosure that include names of
employees, but could limit that disclosure to employees working in the
same department or unit, where each department or unit must be defined
by an identifiable manager or management group to whom discretion to
set and negotiate pay is delegated. In other words, employees should be
able to compare the salaries they have negotiated with their managers to
those that the same managers negotiated with others.
C. What Constitutes Failure To Complain in a Timely Fashion
If an employee failed to complain within 180 days 126 of the
disclosure which put the employee on notice of the allegedly
discriminatory pay, element (2) would be satisfied. Thus, if an employer
updated the pay disclosure website daily, this would create a six month
requirement to complain. It would also essentially create a requirement
that employees check the website approximately every three months, to
126. On some level the choice of when to deem a complaint "untimely" is arbitrary,
but I suggest 180 days because this is the amount of time within which typical employees
must file charges of discrimination with the EEOC or a parallel state agency. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(l) (2006). 180 days would therefore be consistent with the amount of time
employees have to file their non-pay discrimination charges, and would help avoid
unnecessary complexity and confusion.
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give themselves a few months to decide whether to make a complaint to
the employer. If the employer updated only yearly, an employee might
be able to complain up to a year and six months after the discriminatory
pay, because the employee might only be on notice of the disparity a year
after it began.
A complaint would have to be clearly understandable as a complaint
that a pay discrepancy discriminates on the basis of some protected
category. A complaint that pay is "unfair," or otherwise problematic
without alleging some form of discrimination, would not be sufficient, as
a fair number of these complaints can be expected once pay is
transparent, with no intent to allege discrimination. If an employer
creates a formal complaint form that is distributed along with the pay
disclosure to all employees, failure to fill out the form timely can
constitute failure to complain timely, as long as the form provides clear
notice that failure to use it can lead to forfeiting one's claims under Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act.
Finally, the two year cap on back-pay would only be lifted, and the
affirmative defense or safe harbor would only be effective, prospectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having one's salary exposed to one's colleagues is a scary prospect
to many readers, but those who are employees should consider that the
social awkwardness will often be made up for by higher pay, since
employers who take advantage of the pay transparency defense will lose
much of their information advantage in salary negotiations. Moreover,
employers, employees, and legislators should all be excited about the
opportunity to root out both intentional and unintentional gender and race
based wage gaps. All these groups should want work to reward merit,
effort, creativity, and results, rather than the accidents of being friends
with the right people, socialized to negotiate well, or socialized to choose
the right job.
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